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 1 Bell Atlantic v Twombly, 127 S Ct 1955 (2007).
Adam Smith’s views on collusion were injected into the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly as Justice 
Stevens puzzled over why a collusive action might be viewed 
as “right.” Motivation by a desire for approbation provides 
Smith’s explanation for the existence of well- functioning 
groups. “Right” action is approved by the group. The question 
is what happens when the groups are in confl ict. For Smith, 
collusion is one instance of the larger problem of faction in 
which a small group organizes to exploit the larger society.
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Adam Smith acquired yet another fi fteen minutes of fame when his 
views on collusion were injected into the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.1 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter 
footnotes the use of Smith’s argument by the dissent. Souter suggests 
that Smith’s remark about the collusion of masters was “tongue-
 in-cheek:”
the dissent playfully suggests that they conspired to restrain 
trade, an inference said to be ‘buttressed by the common sense 
of Adam Smith.’ If Adam Smith is peering down today, he may 
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be surprised to learn that his  tongue- in-cheek remark would be 
authority to force his famous pinmaker to devote fi nancial and 
human capital to hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and oth-
erwise fend off allegations of conspiracy; all this just because he 
belonged to the same trade guild as one of his competitors when 
their pins carried the same price tag.2
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens quotes the famous passage from 
Smith, and suggests that in fact Smith’s judgment concerning collu-
sion may, in this instance, be on target:
Many years ago a truly great economist perceptively observed 
that ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even 
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.’ I am not so cynical as to accept that sentiment at face 
value, but I need not do so here. Respondents’ complaint points 
not only to petitioners’ numerous opportunities to meet with 
each other, . . . .3
Justice Stevens then notes the famous puzzle: when a company 
agrees to collude with its rivals, it faces the immediate incentive to 
cheat. So the puzzle is, what’s the right thing to do:
also to Notebaert’s curious statement that encroaching on a fel-
low incumbent’s territory ‘might be a good way to turn a quick 
dollar but that doesn’t make it right.’ What did he mean by that? 
One possible (indeed plausible) inference is that he meant that 
while it would be in his company’s economic self- interest to 
compete with its brethren, he had agreed with his competitors 
not to do so.4
Two questions follow immediately. First, did Smith’s remark refl ect 
a serious statement about the prevalence of collusion, i.e. is Justice 
Stevens interpreting Smith correctly? Second, supposing Smith did in 
fact see cooperative behavior as some sort of norm, how was coopera-
tion (or collusion) enforced in his system? Today, economists might 
answer the latter question by presuming a punishment system is in 
force with repeated interactions. Expected payoffs to cheating alter 
with repetition, making it no longer profi table to renege on coop-
erative agreements. All is handled in terms of expected monetary 
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rewards. “Right” actions are determined by the highest expected 
payoff. We suggest that Smith thought otherwise.
Consider fi rst cooperative behavior among the masters. Coopera-
tion can of course be good for society. But when small groups cooperate 
at the expense of large groups, a problem that greatly troubled Smith, 
the outcome is a less happy one. That Smith believed the masters 
were “always and everywhere” in a combination is readily apparent 
in the Wealth of Nations.5 There, he considered the problem of wage 
determination in various societies, supposing a group bargaining 
situation with masters pitted against workmen. The combination of 
masters is, he wrote, “the natural state of things:”
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, 
though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, 
upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant 
of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and every-
where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, 
not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To vio-
late this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, 
and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and 
equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it 
is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which 
nobody ever hears of.6
The problem of small groups exploiting large ones is known as the 
problem of factions. The faction of immediate concern in the chap-
ters on wages and growth in the fi rst book of the Wealth of Nations 
are the masters.
I I .  “ R I G H T ”  A S  A  S U P P O R T  F O R  C O L L U S I O N
The question that follows, is how the faction is maintained when 
there may be monetary rewards to cheating? Smith’s answer was 
that rewards accrue in two incommensurate dimensions, money and 
approbation, and people like both money and approbation. People 
interact using language. These interactions yield two sets of rewards, 
money and approbation, which is carried by language. Approbation 
results from following a norm of reciprocity (from not cheating on 
 agreed-upon actions); disapprobation results from violating it (from 
cheating). Thus, the rewards to co-operation are augmented by the 
approbation that results when a person follows the group norm. For 
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individuals who desire both approbation and income, co-operation 
satisfi es what we have called “katallactic rationality.”7
This provides the solution to Justice Stevens’ puzzle. While a mas-
ter might earn a bit more if he were to deviate from his agreement 
with the masters, he would suffer their disapproval and be shunned 
by the group to which he belongs. So, the masters who co-operate 
are rewarded by the approval of their equals; their conduct would 
be approved, that is, said to be “right.” Of course, when we take the 
larger group into account, this “right” conduct might well be bad for 
society as a whole. The problem of factions is that the cooperation of 
the small group occurs at the expense of a larger group.
In Smith’s account, it is unclear whether the combination will 
succeed or not. What we do know is that the masters have a consid-
erable advantage in his view because they are fewer and richer than 
the workmen.8 At the same time, combinations might not survive 
growth in the demand for labor. In America, Smith fi nds that the 
continual increase in the demand for labor makes employer collu-
sion impossible so that the condition of the working class improves 
dramatically.
This raises the obvious question. If the workers’ condition improves 
but that of the masters deteriorates, is society better or worse off? 
One way to decide is to count those helped and those harmed and to 
appeal to the reader as impartial spectator:
 Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of 
the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency 
to the society? The answer seems at fi rst sight abundantly plain. 
Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the 
far greater part of every great political society. But what improves 
the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an 
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be fl ourish-
ing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are 
poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that, they who feed, 
cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such 
a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves 
tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.9
Smith goes on to emphasize the importance of economic growth for 
the well- being of the children of the poor10 and the infl uence of chil-
dren on judgment.
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I I I .  C O N C L U S I O N
A staple result of experimental economics is that talk supports 
co-operation in social dilemma games.11 Why this is so is less clear to 
modern economists. The impact of language on choice, which Smith 
developed at great length, is now receiving a modicum of professional 
attention.12 People, unlike dogs, trade because they have language 
and a concept of “fairness.” When they select an occupation, people 
are willing to trade material income for the approbation of others.
Explaining co-operation is not the end of the story for Smith, since 
cooperation can produce bad results. Consequently, we need to con-
sider to what end people are co-operating. What concerns Smith is 
the possibility that people co-operate to exploit others. The approba-
tion which supports co-operation also supports collusion.
Motivation by a desire for approbation provides Smith’s expla-
nation for the existence of well- functioning groups. The question, 
however, is what happens when the groups are in confl ict? Smith’s 
answer, supposing that groups constrain themselves by consider-
ations of justice, was to side with the larger group. In this supposition 
and conclusion, Smith was followed by utilitarians in the classical 
period.13
